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The predominant role of cross border ﬁnancial ﬂows for macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability has
imposed complex policy trade-offs for emerging economies, especially after the global ﬁnancial crisis.
This note provides a brief account of the macroprudential policy approach adopted in Turkey between
the years 2011 and 2015, a period when global capital ﬂows exhibited unprecedented volatility. Special
emphasis is put on the use of monetary policy tools for macroprudential purposes. We ﬁrst highlight the
particular role of external ﬂows and the associated tradeoffs in designing the monetary policy and
macroprudential policy framework. Next, we describe the policy implementation by the central bank and
the regulatory authorities, and evaluate the consequent outcomes. Our analysis suggests that macro-
prudential policies have improved external balances, dampened ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation channels, and
reduced the sensitivity of the Turkish economy to capital ﬂows.
© 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Central Bank of The Republic of Turkey. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
4.0/).1. Introduction
The global ﬁnancial crisis has led to a reassessment of
macroeconomic policy formulation across the globe. Countries
have expanded their policy toolkits with macroprudential policies
in recent years to deal with macro ﬁnancial risks.1 The heightened
volatility in capital ﬂows during the post-crisis period has
led to signiﬁcant challenges especially for emerging economies
by worsening policy trade-offs. Such an environment made addi-
tional tools of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial policy more valuable.2e authors' and do not neces-
of the Republic of Turkey. I
Ünalmıs¸, Pınar €Ozlü, Faruk
nk of the Republic of Turkey.
asures across advanced and
al. (2012), Ostry et al. (2012),
Claessens (2014), Galati and
kıncı and Olmstead-Rumsey
B.V. on behalf of Central Bank of TAgainst this backdrop, Turkey has taken a number of steps to-
wards building an institutional setup for implementing explicit
macroprudential policies since 2011. To this end, the Central Bank of
the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) modiﬁed the inﬂation targeting
framework by incorporating ﬁnancial stability as a supplementary
objective. Moreover, a formal Financial Stability Committee (FSC)
was founded to respond to macro-ﬁnancial risks in a more sys-
tematic and coordinated fashion. Through the recommendations of
the FSC, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency has taken
a comprehensive set of measures to contain excessive leverage and
to improve households' ﬁnancial position. This study conducts a
broad evaluation of the macroprudential policy implementation in
Turkey during this process and draws some policy implications.
How to design and implement macroprudential policies has
been of great interest to both policy institutions and academia after
the global ﬁnancial crisis. The renewed interest in conducting
macroprudential policy yielded a substantial amount of research in
recent years. New theoretical results and empirical ﬁndings trig-
gered attempts to streamline and standardise the conduct of
macroprudential policy.3 Although these efforts have tremendously3 See IMF (2013, 2015) and Schoenmaker (2014), among others.
he Republic of Turkey. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
Fig. 1. Private Credit/GDP ratio. Source: World Bank.
H. Kara / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 85e9286contributed to our understanding of macroprudential policy, they
are mostly based on theoretical results or cross-country evidences
with limited attention to country-speciﬁc characteristics. Given the
complexity of instruments, long lags with which they affect the
ﬁnal policy objectives, and the short size of the data, the existing
theoretical and empirical literature may still have to be com-
plemented by case studies. In that sense, we believe that individual
country experiences may provide valuable insights for the design
and conduct of macroprudential policies.
Macroprudential policy experience of Turkey may yield contri-
butions for the current debate at least for two reasons: ﬁrst, Turkey
has been quite active on the macroprudential front in recent years,
using a wide range of tools imposed through restrictions on both
borrowers and ﬁnancial institutions; second, design and imple-
mentation of macroprudential policy framework in Turkey reﬂects
a purely emerging economy perspective, where special emphasis
has been given to the role of capital ﬂows. Understanding this
approach may yield particularly valuable insights, because recent
studies have mostly focused on advanced economy settings. The
central role of capital ﬂows in driving business cycles and macro-
ﬁnancial risks in emerging economies may have different impli-
cations for the conduct of macroprudential policies as well as for
the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies.
The design and implementation of macroprudential policies are
largely country-speciﬁc, depending on the initial cyclical and
structural characteristics of the economy as well as the institutional
background. Therefore, we proceed by describing the initial con-
ditions and the background for the Turkish case.2. Background
Turkey faced rapid credit growth during the past decade on the
back of improved economic fundamentals after the 2001 crisis and
easy global liquidity conditions. The 2001 crisis, which was a home-
made event consisting of amixture of banking, ﬁscal, and balance of
payment crises, incorporated many features of the conventional
crisis literature. The response to such a devastating crisis was
strong. Several structural adjustments took place on ﬁscal, mone-
tary and prudential dimensions. The new Central Bank law, intro-
duction of a ﬂoating exchange rate regime along with inﬂation
targeting, consolidation and strengthening of the banking system
and ﬁscal balances, and foundation of a new banking regulatory
and supervisory agency have made Turkey an attractive destination
for capital ﬂows. Fuelled by ample global liquidity and also sup-
ported by demographic factors, Turkey faced rapid credit growth
during the 2000s, as private credit to GDP ratio rose sharply (Fig. 1).
Perhaps paradoxically, rapid credit growth during the past
decade coincided with a considerably tight bank regulation and
supervision. Prudential policies in Turkey are traditionally imple-
mented through the banking system, as Turkish ﬁnancial inter-
mediation is dominated by banks.4 Reﬂecting the bitter experience
of the past ﬁnancial crises, bank regulation and supervision has
been unambiguously prudent during the past decade. For example,
banks were not allowed to have currency mismatches, foreign
currency loans to consumers were prohibited, and there were re-
strictions on foreign currency lending to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Tight
restrictions were imposed on distributing bank dividends, new
bank entry, branch openings etc. Moreover, Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency (BRSA) imposed signiﬁcantly higher minimum
capital adequacy and liquidity coverage ratios than required by4 As of September 2015, 92.3% of the ﬁnancial liabilities of households are to
banks (see Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Financial Stability Report,
November 2015, Table II.1.2).international standards. Reﬂecting the cautious prudential frame-
work, banks have maintained ample capital and liquidity buffers
during this period.5
Although many of these prudential features had macro impli-
cations, a formal macroprudential perspective was lacking during
the 2000s. BRSA had a microprudential mandate, mostly focussing
on the health of individual banks. CBRT published a ﬁnancial sta-
bility report with a macro perspective, but monetary policy was
conducted under a conventional inﬂation targeting regime, with no
explicit mandate or tool(s) for responding to macro-ﬁnancial risks.
The quantitative easing by advanced economies and the surge of
capital ﬂows to emerging economies after the global ﬁnancial crisis
further highlighted the need to adopt an explicit macro approach to
ﬁnancial stability. The underlying trend of private credit growth
rate climbed to 40% at the end of 2010. Meanwhile, Turkish lira
appreciated rapidly in real terms. These developments were
accompanied by an overheating in the economy and a sharp
widening in the current account deﬁcit. Perhaps more importantly,
the quality of external ﬁnance deteriorated sharply. By the end of
2010, almost all the current account deﬁcit was ﬁnanced by either
short-term or portfolio ﬂows, leaving the economy susceptible to
sudden reversals in global sentiment (Fig. 2).
The large external ﬁnancing needs and the deterioration in the
quality of inﬂows in 2010 have increased the so called “sudden
stop” risks for the Turkish economy. Historically, capital outﬂows
have been the main trigger of output losses across emerging
economies6 and Turkey has been no exception in this regard.
Turkish business cycles were dominated by boom-bust episodes,
which were ampliﬁed by sudden movements in capital ﬂows. The
massive economic contractions in 1994, 2001, and 2009 reﬂected
such episodes. Each recession was accompanied by a net capital
outﬂow (sudden stop) and a disruption in the ﬁnancial system.
Given such an historical background, the sharp deterioration in the
current account balance and the quality of external ﬁnancing by the
end of 2010 called for a timely response, once again highlighting
the need to adopt a macro approach to ﬁnancial stability.7
Although the build-up ofmacro-ﬁnancial risks in 2010 required a
prompt policy response, it was not clear who should react and how
the responsewouldbe executed inpractice. Given thedominant role5 For example, the capital adequacy ratio of the system was above 16%
throughout the period of 2002e10.
6 See Claessens and Ghosh (2013) for some evidence.
7 See Bas¸çı and Kara (2011) for more details on the rationale behind the change in
the policy approach.
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Fig. 2. Initial conditions: Current account deﬁcit and net inﬂows (12 months cumu-
lative, billion USD). Source: CBRT.
Table 1
Augmenting the traditional inﬂation targeting framework.
Previous approach New approach
Objectives Price Stability Price Stability
Financial Stability
Policy tool(s) Policy Rate Policy Rate
Interest Rate Corridor
Reserve Req. Policy
Fig. 3. The role of CBRT's monetary instruments to dampen the ampliﬁcation effects of
cross-border ﬂows. Source: CBRT.
9 The mechanics and transmission of the wide interest rate corridor and the
reserve option mechanism (ROM) are explained through several working papers
and documents published at the CBRT website. See, for example, Alper, Kara, and
Y€orükoglu (2013a), Küçüksaraç and €Ozel (2012) and Aslaner et al. (2015) on the
ROM; Bas¸çı and Kara (2011, 2013), Alper, Kara, and Y€orükoglu (2013b), Binici et al.
(2013), Küçük et al. (2016) on the interest rate corridor, among others.
10 Kara (2015) provide the operational details on how the short-term interest
H. Kara / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 85e92 87of the banks in the Turkish ﬁnancial intermediation, one natural
candidatewas thebank regulator. TheBRSAhadall the relevant tools
to contain credit growth, which would help limit the over-
borrowing tendency of economic agents. Yet, looking from the reg-
ulator'smicro perspective, therewas no sense of urgency to respond
to the rapid loan growth: bank balance sheets looked healthy,
proﬁtability was high, capital and liquidity positions were
comfortable, and non-performing loans were low. Nonetheless, the
situation looked farmore concerning and urgent fromamacro point
of view. Under these circumstances, the CBRT decided to step in.
3. Macroprudential policy implementation
3.1. The ﬁrst phase: devising monetary instruments for
macroprudential purposes
The lack of a formal institutional setup for containing macro-
ﬁnancial risks in Turkey has prompted the CBRT to take a leading
role at the end of 2010. Accordingly, the CBRT adopted a new policy
strategy to contain macro-ﬁnancial risks and to address the chal-
lenges posed by volatile capital ﬂows. To this end, the conventional
inﬂation targeting regime was modiﬁed by incorporating ﬁnancial
stability as a supplementary objective. Price stability remained as
the overriding objective, while policy focus was broadened to
include macro-ﬁnancial risksdespecially macroeconomic volatility
caused by excessive global liquidity cycles. To this end, the policy
toolkit was expanded to include reserve requirements and a ﬂex-
ible interest rate corridor system (Table 1).
The new strategy focused on containing the adverse effects of
the capital ﬂow volatility on the domestic economy. Faced by
rapidly widening current account deﬁcits and a deterioration in the
quality of external ﬁnance, priority was given to reducing the
probability of a sudden disruption in external ﬁnancial ﬂows. In this
context, the CBRT pointed out the importance of containing
excessive borrowing (credit growth) and reducing exchange rate
misalignments. Meanwhile, the CBRT also highlighted the need to
dampen the interaction between capital ﬂows, exchange rates and
credit growth, which ampliﬁes the business cycle ﬂuctuations in an
emerging economy with currency mismatches as illustrated in
Fig. 3.8
Needless to say, such a diverse approach necessitates the use of a
variety of policy instruments. Accordingly, the CBRT devised new
instruments such as “asymmetric interest rate corridor” and8 Hofmann et al. (2016) use a similar mechanism for explaining the role of cross-
border ﬂows as an amplifying factor for business cycles.“reserve option mechanism”. As Fig. 3 depicts, the former aims at
smoothing the volatility of capital ﬂows, while the latter is designed
to weaken the link between capital ﬂows and domestic macro-
economic variables.9 Overall, these unconventional tools aim to
ease the policy tradeoffs associated with the volatility in capital
ﬂows by dampening the amplifying role of capital ﬂows.
Implementation of the new policy framework during the initial
stages deserves special attention, as it provides an interesting
example of using monetary tools for macroprudential purposes. In
the absence of a formal institutional setup and explicit tools to
conduct macroprudential measures, the CBRT decided to use
reserve requirement ratios and a wide interest rate corridor as
cyclical tools to respond to credit growth and capital ﬂow volatility.
Fig. 4 shows how the two main tools evolved between mid-2010
and mid-2011. The CBRT raised reserve requirement ratios (Fig. 4,
bottom panel) signiﬁcantly and stopped remunerating required
reserves at the end of 2010 to contain rapid credit growth. At the
same time, volatility in short-term money market rates were
increased through the active use of interest rate corridor (Fig. 4, top
panel) in order to reduce the attractiveness of short-term carry-
trade type of inﬂows.10 As a result, effective reserve requirement
ratio for the banking system rose sharply by about 12 percentage
points and interest rate volatility in the overnight repo market
increased substantially.11
Despite these intensive efforts by the CBRT, a signiﬁcant slow-
down in credit could be observed only after the bank regulator'srates are set ﬂexibly within the interest rate corridor by changing the composition
of central bank funding.
11 Effective cost-based reserve requirement ratio calculation is based on Ünalmıs¸
and Ünalmıs¸ (2015).
Fig. 4. Interest rate corridor and reserve requirement ratios. Source: CBRT.
Fig. 5. Credit growth (annual % change, adjusted for exchange rate valuation effects).
Source: CBRT.
H. Kara / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 85e9288measures by mid-2011 (Fig. 5).12 Unconventional monetary in-
struments alone were not able to bring down the private credit
growth to reasonable levels initially, because of their indirect na-
ture to inﬂuence the supply and demand for loans.13 Although the
acceleration of credit stopped after the hikes in the reserve
requirement ratio, annual loan growth remained elevated at
around 35% during the ﬁrst half of 2011, leading to concerns
regarding the effectiveness of the CBRT's new policy strategy.
The new multiple-tools-multiple-objectives framework
complicated the communication of monetary policy. Uncertainty
regarding the transmission mechanism of new instruments
hampered the predictability and accountability of policies. The
theoretical and empirical literature on the effectiveness of these
instruments were scarce and not robust enough to convince the
public. Given the inherently vague nature of ﬁnancial stability and
the difﬁculty of linking each tool to objectives, the joint use of
multiple instruments for multiple purposes posed signiﬁcant
communication challenges for the CBRT. Notwithstanding the
drawbacks related to communication and effectiveness of uncon-
ventional instruments, the efforts by the CBRT to contain macro-
ﬁnancial risks have increased the awareness of the need to12 The next section provides more details on BRSA measures.
13 Bas¸çı and Kara (2011) provide an assessment of the impact of reserve re-
quirements and short-term interest rate volatility on ﬁnancial variables and credit
growth during the initial stages of policy implementation. Alper et al. (2014) offer
more detailed analysis on the transmission mechanism of reserve requirements
through bank lending behaviour.establish a formal institutional body for macroprudential policies,
paving the way for the foundation of the Financial Stability
Committee.3.2. The second phase: Financial Stability Committee (FSC)
3.2.1. Organisation structure and functions of the FSC
The foundation of the FSC in June 2011 was a major step towards
establishing a formal macroprudential framework in Turkey.
Chaired by the deputy primeminister in charge of economy, the FSC
is a body that brings together all the major relevant institutions for
ﬁnancial stability: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency,
Central Bank, Treasury, Capital Markets Board, and Saving Deposit
Insurance Fund. The idea is to enhance information sharing, coor-
dination and cooperation between parties. The FSC does not have
its own tools; each institution has its own mandate and re-
sponsibility. Therefore, the power and the tools rest with the
relevant authorities. The main duties of the FSC are to assess sys-
temic risks, identify necessary measures and make policy
recommendations.
The FSC facilitated the implementation of prudential policies
directly for the aim of reducing macro-ﬁnancial risks. The estab-
lishment of the FSC helped the relevant institutions to internalise
the macroeconomic and systemic dimension of ﬁnancial stability,
lifting some of the weight off the CBRT's shoulders. Through the
recommendations of the FSC, relevant institutions have taken a
comprehensive set of measures to contain excessive leverage and
improve the quality of external ﬁnancing.
Macroprudential policies envisaged under the guidance of the
FSC have further extended the CBRT's previous individual efforts to
alleviate the adverse impact of global liquidity swings on the do-
mestic economy. To this end, the FSC focused on two main pillars:
1. containing credit growth (especially by reducing household
indebtedness); and
2. improving the quality of bank liabilities.
The ﬁrst pillar is related to over-borrowing and current account
deﬁcit, while the second one largely pertains to the quality of
capital inﬂows. Taken together, these intermediate goals intend to
increase the resilience of the economy against external ﬁnance
shocks.3.2.2. Containing credit growth and household debt
The link between macro-ﬁnancial risks and credit growth has
beenwell documentedby the literature.Historically, credit booms are
identiﬁed to be themost robust and signiﬁcant predictors of ﬁnancial
crises.14More recent evidence suggests that the composition of credit
matters as well. For example, a rise in the household debt-to-GDP
ratio is associated with higher current account deﬁcits and predicts
lower output growth over the medium run.15 For the Turkish case,
macro-ﬁnancial aspects of the household debt is even more relevant
due to its close relation with the current account deﬁcit.16
Against this backdrop, containing consumer loan growth has
been one of the priorities for the FSC. The measures to contain
credit growth and household debt were mainly taken by the BRSA,
with the recommendations of the FSC. The measures were14 See, for example, Borio and Lowe (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Jorda
et al. (2011), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and Schularick and Taylor (2012).
15 See Mian, Suﬁ and Verner (2015).
16 Aliogulları et al. (2015) ﬁnd that consumer loans are tightly associated with the
current account balance in Turkey, while the link between commercial loans and
current account is weaker.
Fig. 6. (a) Consumer and commercial loan growth (annual % change), (b) Household assets and liabilities (billion TL). Source: CBRT.
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H. Kara / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 85e92 89introduced in two rounds of macroprudential tightening. The ﬁrst
package, which was implemented throughout 2011, included
higher risk weights and general provisions for consumer loans,
higher minimum payments for credit card debt, and loan-to-value
(LTV) caps for housing loans. The second package, which came in
late 2013early 2014 introduced further caps, limits and higher risk
weights on credit cards, LTV ceilings for vehicle loans, and maturity
restrictions for uncollateralised consumer loans.
These measures, coupled with a tighter monetary policy stance,
had a signiﬁcant impact on loan growth as depicted in Fig. 6-a.
Consumer loans displayed a marked deceleration each time a new
round of measures were introduced. The annual rate of growth in
consumer loans slowed from 45% in mid-2011 to less than 15% in
2015. As a consequence, the upward trend in household indebt-
edness ratio (household liabilities over assets) has reversed since
2013 (Fig. 6-b). The deceleration in commercial loans were less
pronounced, because this segment was not directly targeted by the
macroprudential measures. Overall, these observations suggest
that macroprudential measures have been instrumental in con-
taining credit growth and household indebtedness, and changing
the composition of credit.173.2.3. Improving the quality of ﬁnancing
The BRSA measures to contain credit growth mainly addressed
the issues related to current account balance and asset side of the17 Studies published in the ﬁnancial stability reports of the CBRT also draw similar
conclusions. See, for example, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Financial
Stability Report November 2014 for the impact analysis of measures regarding
consumer loans.ﬁnancial intermediaries. On the other hand, improving the quality of
the liability side, which is closely associatedwith the ﬁnancing of the
current account deﬁcit, was also deemed essential to increase the
resilience of the ﬁnancial system. After the global ﬁnancial crisis, the
banking system ﬁnanced credit growth predominantly through
external borrowing (non-core liabilities). Moreover, the share of
short-term non-core liabilities increased substantially during this
period. Although the banks in Turkey do not hold excessive currency
mismatches in their balance sheets due to regulatory restrictions,
the increasing share of non-core liabilities (as evidenced by rising
credit-to-deposit ratios) and shortened maturities were still of
concern to the FSC from a macro-ﬁnancial perspective.
Macroprudential measures to improve the composition of bank
liabilities were mainly implemented by the CBRT through reserve
requirement (RR) policies. To this end, RR ratios and remuneration
rates were differentiated across several dimensions, providing in-
centives for the banking system to prefer (i) core liabilities over non-
core liabilities, (ii) long-term over short-term liabilities, and (iii)
Turkish Lira (TL) over FX liabilities. Among these objectives,
lengthening thematurity of external debt and increasing the share of
core liabilities were seen as particularly essential to boost the resil-
ience of the ﬁnancial institutions against external ﬁnance shocks.
Although RR policies have been used actively since end-2010, it
is important to note that during the initial stages, they were used
mostly for cyclical purposes (see the previous section), and thus did
not directly target non-core versus core components of liabilities.1818 During the initial stages, the CBRT also attempted to use the RR ratios for the
purpose of lengthening maturities of domestic currency deposits, which had a
limited impact on the average maturity of deposits.
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19 Using a comprehensive panel data set, Aysan et al. (2016) ﬁnd that domestic
credit growth has become less sensitive to cross-border portfolio ﬂows in emerging
economies after the implementation of macroprudential policies.
H. Kara / Central Bank Review 16 (2016) 85e9290The most signiﬁcant package regarding the composition of liabil-
ities came at late 2014 and early 2015, when the CBRT decided to
increase the RR ratios for short-term (up to one-year maturity)
non-core liabilities sharply from 13% to 20% in two consecutive
steps. At the same time, the remuneration rates for required re-
serves were adjusted so as to provide incentives to increase the
share of core liabilities.
Fig. 7 suggests that RR-based measures have induced signiﬁcant
changes in the composition of bank liabilities. Following the
announcement of RR measures by the CBRT, the share of non-core
short-term liabilities in total non-core liabilities has declined
signiﬁcantly, falling from 53% to 28% throughout 2015 (Fig. 7-a).
Meanwhile, the increasing trend of credit/deposit ratio, which has
been ongoing for many years, receded after the introduction of RR
measures (Fig. 7-b).
Up to this point, we have evaluated the impact of macro-
prudential policies through bank balance sheets. Now we turn to
macroeconomic implications. In macro terms, the main goals of
macroprudential policies in Turkey during the 201115 period
were to contain current account deﬁcits, improve the quality of
external ﬁnance and reduce the sensitivity of domestic economy to
the excessive volatility in capital ﬂows. In order to assess the
overall rebalancing performance, we will document the evolution
of relevant variables after the introduction of macroprudential
measures.
We beginwith the current account balance and the composition
of external ﬁnance. Fig. 8, which is an extended version of Fig. 2,
shows the current account deﬁcit and net capital inﬂows on a 12-
month cumulative basis. Since 2011, there has been a steady decline
in the current account deﬁcit. Moreover, the share of FDI and long-
term inﬂows in total net inﬂows have increased persistently. As of
the writing of this note, current account deﬁcit was ﬁnanced
entirely through FDI and long-term borrowing.
In sum, both the current account balance and the quality
external ﬁnance have improved markedly since the implementa-
tion of macroprudential policies. Admittedly, the Fed tapering
process and the decline in commodity prices have also contributed
to the rebalancing process since 2013. However, it is also important
to note that the improvement in the current account balance and
the composition of external ﬁnancing have begun way earlier,
coinciding exactly with the formal introduction of explicit macro-
prudential measures by the authorities. These observations lend
support to the view that macroprudential policies were instru-
mental in driving the rebalancing in the Turkish economy since
2011.Another purpose of the macroprudential policies in Turkey was
to weaken the ampliﬁcation channels driven by global ﬁnancial
ﬂows. The interaction between net capital ﬂows, exchange rate and
domestic credit is likely to be the key mechanism in emerging
economies amplifying the impact of the cross-border ﬂows, as
suggested by Mendoza and Terrones (2008), Bruno and Shin (2015)
and Hofmann et al. (2016), among others. Fig. 9 suggests that this
mechanism might have been relevant for the Turkish case. The
cyclical component of capital ﬂows, real exchange rate and bank
loans for Turkey typically move closely with each other with some
leadelag relationship, conﬁrming the close interaction between
capital ﬂow cycles and key ﬁnancial variables. Yet, the evolution of
these variables before and after the adoption of macroprudential
policies reveals an interesting point: the amplitude of the cycles
have been dampened considerably since the adoption of the mac-
roprudential policies in 2011. This observation suggests that the
macroprudential policies may have had some impact on the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanisms driven by cross-border ﬂows,
although more concrete evidence is needed to assess the exact
drivers underlying these developments. Our interpretation is that
domestic credit growth and exchange rates have become less
sensitive to capital ﬂows due tomacroprudential measures adopted
to curb credit growth.19 Several recent studies by the CBRT staff also
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Fig. 10. GDP growth and net capital ﬂows. Source: Kara, €Ozlü, and Ünalmıs¸ (2015).
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terest rate corridor and the reserve requirement policies may have
contributed to this process (see also the diagram in Fig. 3).20
Given the central role of capital ﬂow volatility in the design of
Turkey's macroprudential policies, the ultimate success during the
period of interest should be rather judged by the following ques-
tion: has the domestic economic activity become less sensitive to
cross-border ﬂows? A simple eyeballing of the co-movement be-
tween net capital ﬂows and domestic economic activity in Fig. 10
suggests that the answer is likely to be afﬁrmative. Historically,
Turkish GDP has been closely correlated with capital ﬂows
(possibly with a two-way causality). However, the relationship
seems to have weakened considerably since 2011. Net capital ﬂows
exhibited heightened volatility during this period, while the GDP
growth rate hovered between 2% and 5%, which was remarkably
stable compared to historical patterns.4. Conclusion and ﬁnal remarks
Turkey's experience with macroprudential policy conﬁrms that
there is no single recipe for the design of macroprudential policies.
Initial conditions and structural characteristics matter for the
choice and implementation of particular instruments, which inter
alia implies that policies designed for emerging economies may
need to involve different features than advanced economies. For
example, the interaction of monetary policy with ﬁnancial stability
andmacroprudential policies should take into account the complex
trade-offs exacerbated by the capital ﬂow cycles and their impli-
cations for monetary policy. Against this backdrop, macro-
prudential policies in Turkey have focused on containing the
adverse impacts of the global liquidity cycles and the associated
capital ﬂow volatility on the domestic economy. Policies were ori-
ented towards dampening the adverse feedback loops and credit
cycles in order to reduce the probability of a sudden stop. At the
same time, additional measures were introduced to increase the
resilience of the ﬁnancial system against global shocks.
The analysis carried out in this paper suggests that the macro-
prudential policies have signiﬁcantly contributed to the rebalanc-
ing process and bolstered the resilience of the economy against
external shocks. Since 2011, the current account deﬁcit has been on
a steady declining trend and the sensitivity of economic activity to
capital ﬂow volatility have weakened considerably, implying a
more balanced and sustainable growth path. Overall, Turkey's
recent experience have demonstrated that, targeted20 See Mimir et al. (2012), Binici et al. (2013), Degerli and Fendoglu (2015) and
Aysan et al. (2014) on the effectiveness of interest rate corridor and the reserve
option mechanism on credit growth and exchange rate volatility.macroprudential policies along with unconventional monetary
measures can improve the tradeoffs posed by volatile capital ﬂows.
However, it is also important to note that macroprudential
policies cannot be a substitute for sound structural reforms. In
many cases, macroprudential policies can rather be regarded as
second-best solutions that save time until deeper structural ad-
justments take place. To the extent structural policies are able to
sufﬁciently increase the resilience of the economy on their own,
there could be less of a role for unconventional monetary policy as
well as for macroprudential policies. Therefore, in the long term, it
is essential to undertake structural measures to improve the trade-
offs posed by large and volatile capital ﬂows. As with the Turkish
case, bringing down structural component of the current account
deﬁcit (by increasing saving rates and boosting productivity) and
reducing dollarisation (by deepening ﬁnancial markets and
achieving price stability) can be listed among priorities.References
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